Accordingly, the Court held that such schemes violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they are adopted with a discriminatory purpose and have the effect of diluting minority voting strength. SHAW v. RENO(1993) No. That claim, the majority concluded, was barred by United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977) (UJO). 430 U. S., at 165. See, e. g., White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 153-155 (1971). Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184. -the shape of the district was not compact or contiguous. 649-652. They also point out that in 1990 a black candidate defeated a white opponent in the Democratic Party runoff for a United States Senate seat before being defeated narrowly by the Republican incumbent in the general election. The majority also rejected appellants' claim that North Carolina's reapportionment plan was impermissible. In determining whether a use of race is permissible in cases in which there is a bizarrely shaped district, we can readily look to its effects, just as we would in evaluating any other electoral districting scheme. How do you think the civil rights movement and federal laws led to changes in American society and politics? (referring variously to "strict scrutiny," "the standard of review employed in Wygant," and "heightened scrutiny"); id., at 520 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment) ("strict scrutiny"); id., at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (classifications" 'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives'" (quoting Regents of Univ. Syllabus. Finally, we must ask whether otherwise permissible redistricting to benefit an underrepresented minority group becomes impermissible when the minority group is defined by its race. ); id., at 518 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Wygant, 476 U. S., at 280282 (plurality opinion); id., at 286 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Hence, I see no need. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. But even recast as a Fourteenth Amendment case, Gomillion does not assist the majority, for its focus was on the alleged effect of the city's action, which was to exclude black voters from the municipality of Tuskegee. It is for these reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny. The company raises all equity from outside financing. They were the first blacks to represent North Carolina, a state with a 20 percent black population, since 1901. Appellants contend that redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face that it is "unexplainable on grounds other than race," Arlington Heights, supra, at 266, demands the same close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race. Id., at 151-152 (emphasis added). These principles apply not only to legislation that contains explicit racial distinctions, but also to those "rare" statutes that, although race-neutral, are, on their face, "unexplainable on grounds other than race." 3. Laws that explicitly distinguish between individuals on racial grounds fall within the core of that prohibition. Classifications of citizens on the basis of race "are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." It is true, of course, that one's vote may be more or less effective depending on the interests of the other individuals who are in one's district, and our cases recognize the reality that members of the same race often have shared interests. See Brief for Republican National Committee as Amicus Curiae 14-15. There is thus no theoretical inconsistency in having two distinct approaches to equal protection analysis, one for. (1986) (teacher layoffs), electoral districting calls for decisions that nearly always require some consideration of race for legitimate reasons where there is a racially mixed population. What appellants object to is redistricting legislation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification. Action verbs tell what the subject is doing or what is being done to the subject. The Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving discriminatory intent. As we explained in Feeney: "A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only. Following is the Case Brief for Baker v. Carr, United States Supreme Court, (1962) Case Summary of Baker v. Carr: A Tennessee resident brought suit against the Secretary of State claiming that the failure to redraw the legislative districts every ten years, as outlined in the state constitution, resulted in rural votes holding more votes . Yes; the Court agreed that the shape of the proposed district was so odd that there was no compelling explanation for its shape other than separating voters by race. Does the Equal Protection Clause prevent a State from drawing district boundaries for the purpose of. There is a characteristic coincidence of disadvantageous effect and illegitimate purpose associated with the State's use of race in those situations in which it has immediately trig-. That argument strikes a powerful historical chord: It is unsettling how closely the North Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past. Ante, at 653; see also ante, at 658.8, Nonetheless, in those cases where this cause of action is sufficiently pleaded, the State will have to justify its decision to consider race as being required by a compelling state interest, and its use of race as narrowly tailored to that interest. Might the consumer be better off with $2,000\$2,000$2,000 in income? Finally, like New York, North Carolina reacted by modifying its plan and creating additional majority-minority districts. Thus, "an equal protection violation may be found only where the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to influence the political process effectively." 1983). in M1 and M2? It may therefore be that few electoral districting cases are ever likely to employ the strict scrutiny the Court holds to be applicable on remand if appellants' allegations are "not contradicted." Indicate whether each account would flow into the income statement, retained earnings statement, or balance sheet. After the Attorney General of the United States objected to the plan pursuant to 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. Draper uses the allowance method for receivables, estimating uncollectibles to be 5% of January credit sales. In Gingles the Court considered a multimember redistricting plan for the North Carolina State Legislature. Ruth O. Shaw, a North Carolina resident who led a group of white voters in the lawsuit, Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas. App. After the General Assembly passed legislation creating the second district, a group of white voters in North Carolina, led by Ruth O. Shaw, sued on the grounds that the district was an unconstitutional gerrymander . This is the reason that the placement of given voters in a given district, even on the basis of race, does not, without more, diminish the effectiveness of the individual as a voter. Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for federal appellees. There is no independent constitutional requirement of compactness or contiguity, and the Court's opinion (despite its many references to the shape of District 12, see ante, at 635-636, 641, 642, 644-648) does not suggest otherwise. The group claimed that the districts were racial gerrymanders that violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, on remand North Carolina might claim that it adopted the revised plan in order to comply with the 5 "nonretrogression" principle. This Court has held political gerrymanders to be justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause. Shaw. In the absence of an allegation of such harm, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court. understood as anything other than an effort to "segregat[e] voters" on the basis of race. See ante, at 642-643. 15, 1. Id., at 154-155. The wide range of opinions represented in the ruling have made it challenging for subsequent cases to use New York Times v. United States as precedent. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S., at 118-127. This problem continues the Draper Consulting situation from previous problems. 1 "Bloc racial voting is an unfortunate phenomenon, but we are repeatedly faced with the findings of knowledgeable district courts that it is a fact of life. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S. 25, 40-41 (1993) ("Unless these points are established, there neither has been a wrong nor can be a remedy"). Unlike other contexts in which we have addressed the State's conscious use of race, see, e. g., Richmond v. J. Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent. Ante, at 653. Accord, Wygant, 476 U. S., at 273 (plurality opinion). Proc. The principle of equality is at war with the notion that District A must be represented by a Negro, as it is with the notion that District B must be represented by a Caucasian, District C by a Jew, District D by a Catholic, and so on . That system, by whatever name it is called, is a divisive force in a community, emphasizing differences between candidates and voters that are irrelevant in the constitutional sense . "When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the multiracial, multireligious communities that our Constitution seeks to weld together as one become separatist; antagonisms that relate to race or to religion rather than to political issues are generated; communities seek not the best representative but the best racial or religious partisan. 14, 1. The second majority-black district, District 12, is even more unusually shaped. In fact, our country's long and persistent history of racial discrimination in voting-as well as our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, which always has reserved the strictest scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of race, see supra, at 642-644-would seem to compel the opposite conclusion. Race in redistricting is permissible as long as configurations are not too extreme, ch 7 part 2 prep pronouns and demonstratives, Christina Dejong, Christopher E. Smith, George F Cole, Government in America: Elections and Updates Edition, George C. Edwards III, Martin P. Wattenberg, Robert L. Lineberry. The Court today answers this question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. Ante, at 646 (emphasis in original). The majority attempts to distinguish UJO by imagining a heretofore unknown type of constitutional claim. We said as much in Gaffney: "[C]ourts have [no] constitutional warrant to invalidate a state plan, otherwise within tolerable population limits, because it undertakes, not to minimize or eliminate the political strength of any group or party, but to recognize it and, through districting, provide a rough sort of proportional representation in the legislative halls of the State." 364 U. S., at 341. I respectfully dissent. Post, at 671 (WHITE, J., dissenting); see also post, at 684 (SOUTER, J., dissenting). What trade-offs are involved in deciding to have a single large, centrally located facility instead of These lawmakers are quite aware that the districts they create will have a white or a black majority; and with each new district comes the unavoidable choice as to the racial composition of the district." depends on these twin elements. But numerous North Carolinians did. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 304-305 (1978) (Powell, J.) We therefore consider what that level of scrutiny requires in the reapportionment context. A. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. I read these decisions quite differently. Under that principle, a proposed voting change cannot be precleared if it will lead to "a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." In its 1993 decision, the Supreme Court agreed, ruling that race cannot be the predominant factor in creating districts. When an assumption that people in a particular minority group (whether they are defined by the political party, religion, ethnic group, or race to which they belong) will vote in a particular way is used to benefit that group, no constitutional violation occurs. Because the General Assembly's reapportionment plan affected the covered counties, the parties agree that 5 applied. Today we hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. One state legislator has remarked that" '[i]f you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district.'" Id., at 56-58. This rule applies as well to a classification that is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious pretext for racial discrimination. 808 F. Shaw appealed. In the absence of an allegation of such harm, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court. As UJO held, a State is entitled to take such action. It involves, instead, an attempt to equalize treatment, and to provide minority voters with an effective voice in the political process. Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said: ''When It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing"?, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. Thus. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. To comply with 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 - which prohibits a covered jurisdiction from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without federal authorization - North Carolina submitted to the Attorney General a congressional . Even Justice Whit-. To begin with, the complaint nowhere alleges any type of stigmatic harm. But it did not purport to overrule Gomillion or Wright. An understanding of the nature of appellants' claim is critical to our resolution of the case. Accord, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967). 2. Fast Facts: Baker v. Carr Ibid. What is the purpose of an input device? tutes an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 144 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting). If the allegation of racial gerrymandering remains uncontradicted, the District Court further must determine whether the North Carolina plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. What I am saying is that in electoral districting there frequently are permissible uses of race, such as its use to comply with the Voting Rights Act, as well as impermissible ones. Did North Carolina residents claim that the 1990 redistricting plan discriminated on the basis of race raise a valid constitutional issue under the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? But while district irregularities may provide strong indicia of a potential gerrymander, they do no more than that. If it is permissible to draw boundaries to provide adequate representation for rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic Jews, for Polish Americans, or for Republicans, it necessarily follows that it is permissible to do the same thing for members of the very minority group whose history in the United States gave birth to the Equal Protection Clause. A contrary conclusion could only be described as perverse. Of the following two options-creation of two minority influence districts or of a single majority-minority district-is one "narrowly tailored" and the other not? 2 See Karcher, 462 U. S., at 748 (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("If they serve no purpose other than to favor one segment-whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or political-that may occupy a position of strength at a particular point in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of, duty to govern impartially is abused when a group with power over the electoral process defines electoral boundaries solely to enhance its own political strength at the expense of any weaker group. The state appellees suggest that a covered jurisdiction may have a compelling interest in creating majority-minority. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469,494 (plurality opinion). Katzenbach, Michael R. Cole, Alan E. Kraus, Laughlin McDonald, Kathy Wilde, E. Richard Larson, and Dennis Courtland Hayes; for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., by Elaine R. Jones, Charles Stephen Ralston, and Dayna L. Cunningham; and for Bolley Johnson et al. The facts of this case mirror those presented inUnited Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey(1977) (UJO), where the Court rejected a claim that creation of a majority-minority district violated the Constitution, either as aper sematter or in light of the circumstances leading to the creation of such a district. The difficulty of proof, of course, does not mean that a racial gerrymander, once established, should receive less scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause than other state legislation classifying citizens by race. The plaintiffs alleged that the plan was drawn with the intent to segregate voters on the basis of race, in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. denied, 409 U. S. 893 (1972); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 83-94 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 744-765 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109, 161-185 (1986) (Powell, J., joined by STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Before us, the state appellees contend that the General Assembly's revised plan was necessary not to prevent retrogression, but to avoid dilution of black voting strength in violation of 2, as construed in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986). 2. enough enclaves of black neighborhoods." You already receive all suggested Justia Opinion Summary Newsletters. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Under this approach, in the absence of an allegation of such cognizable harm, there is no need for further scrutiny because a gerrymandering claim cannot be proven without the element of harm. The Justices disagreed only as to whether the plaintiffs had carried their burden of proof at trial. You can explore additional available newsletters here. UJO, supra, at 148. At some points the district was no wider than Interstate 85, prompting one state legislator to remark that if "you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district." Cf. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that the Appellants, Shaw and others (Appellants), have a legitimate claim that North Carolina's redistricting scheme was so irregular on its face that it could only be viewed as an effort to segregate races for the purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting Appellants' racial gerrymandering claims must be examined against the backdrop of this country's long history of racial discrimination in voting. Putting that to one side, it seems utterly implausible to me to presume, as the Court does, that North Carolina's creation of this strangely shaped majority-minority district "generates" within the white plaintiffs here anything comparable to "a feeling of inferi-. 14, 27-29. Indeed, the Voting Rights Act and our case law make clear that a reapportionment plan that satisfies 5 still may be enjoined as unconstitutional. Richmond v. J. In my view there is no justification for the. The State chose to submit its plan to the Attorney General for preclearance. Centered in the northeast portion of the State, it moves southward until it tapers to a narrow band; then, with finger-like extensions, it reaches far into the southernmost part of the State near the South Carolina border. What was Justice Blackmun's dissent opinion? The Court offers them no explanation of this paradox. Supp., at 475-477 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court held that although North Carolina's reapportionment plan was racially neutral on its face, the resulting district shape was bizarre enough to suggest that it constituted an effort to separate voters into different districts based on race. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Democratic National Committee et al. Constitutional Principle. 461 (EDNC 1992). Shaw v Hunt. Thus, for example, awarding government contracts on a racial basis excludes certain firms from competition on racial grounds. The Court found that race could not be the deciding factor when drawing districts. these are all arguments for ( ) side. Although I disagree with the holding that appellants' claim is cognizable, the Court's discussion of the level of scrutiny it requires warrants a few comments. This question also need not be decided at this stage of the litigation. cial harms that are not present in our vote-dilution cases. 1994), probable jurisdiction noted 115 . Regents of Univ. I have no doubt that a State's compliance with the Voting Rights Act clearly constitutes a compelling interest. The message that such districting sends to elected representatives is equally pernicious. Wright illustrates the difficulty of determining from the face of a single-member districting plan that it purposefully distinguishes between voters on the basis of race. 460, 472 (SDNY 1962) (Murphy, J., dissenting); 376 U. S., at 54. To help you find the subject, ask, Who answered? The dissenters consider the circumstances of this case "functionally indistinguishable" from multimember districting and at-large voting systems, which are loosely described as "other varieties of gerrymandering." North Carolina's decision to create a majority-minority district can be explained as an attempt to meet this objection. The ruling was significant in the area of redistricting and racial gerrymandering. Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as a dramatic and severe response to the situation. Bush administration rejected this plan on the grounds that it gave blacks insufficient congressional representation. U. S. 92-357 Argued: April 20, 1993 Decided: June 28, 1993. 3. To comply with 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965-which prohibits a covered jurisdiction from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or . Statement 102a. Rather, the issue is whether the classification based on race discriminates. The purposes of favoring minority voters and complying with the Voting Rights Act are not discriminatory in the constitutional sense, the court reasoned, and majority-minority districts have an impermissibly discriminatory effect only when they unfairly dilute or cancel out white voting strength. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. cases of electoral districting and one for most other types of state governmental decisions. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 279-280 (1986) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.) A state must prove a compelling interest in order to survive a legal challenge to the redistricting plan. Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said: "When It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing"?, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 161-162 (1977) (UJO) (pluralityopinion of WHITE, J., joined by Brennan, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ. 808 F. That argument strikes a powerful historical chord: It is unsettling how closely the North Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past. Rather, the parties agree that 5 applied -the shape of the district Court and the. 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